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 Professionalism has an idealistic dimension and an institutional 
one. The idealistic dimension is the notion of voluntary commitment 
to both client interests and public values. The institutional dimen-
sion is the ideal of self-regulation by the bar.  
 The idealistic dimension remains powerful. However disappointed 
we are by the distance between the profession’s ideals and its mem-
bers’ practices, these ideals continue to inspire valuable efforts. Vari-
ous professional organizations are making admirable contributions 
through pro bono representation of disadvantaged people, public 
education, and disinterested law reform efforts in a range of areas, 
such as litigation procedure, prisons, and judicial selection. More-
over, the bar’s ideals of public service provide the vantage point from 
which the profession’s critics assess and propose improvements to its 
practices. 
 The institutional dimension is another story. It is implausible in 
principle and corrupt in practice. Its current manifestations are a set 
of strained rationalizations for tawdry self-seeking. The cynicism 
that the bar’s self-regulatory project induces in lay people spills over 
to discredit the idealistic dimension. We could strengthen the appeal 
of the idealistic dimension of professionalism by jettisoning the insti-
tutional one, or at least revising it substantially. 
 The core of the institutional dimension is private, monopolistic 
regulation. Traditionally, professionals have sought to exempt them-
selves from the suspicion that conventionally attends private monop-
oly. But few disinterested observers have been persuaded. It is not 
certain that the bar acts as a self-seeking monopolist, but in such 
matters as admission to practice, the marketing of legal services, and 
even conflict and disclosure norms, it seems unlikely that a self-
seeking monopolist would have behaved any differently. 
 The most salient alternative to private monopolistic self-
regulation is public regulation through state institutions. I think 
                                                                                                                    
 * William and Gertrude Saunders Professor of Law, Stanford University. I gave a 
version of this Article as the Mason Ladd Lecture at the Florida State University College 
of Law in March, 2002. Thanks to Dean Donald Weidner, Rob Atkinson and the FSU com-
munity for their hospitality on that occasion. 
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that some of the most promising recent developments in professional 
responsibility have occurred through interventions of national public 
institutions applying general legal norms in ways that have modified 
or put pressure on the profession’s own norms. What comes to mind 
is the Supreme Court’s striking down of various restrictions on ad-
mission and marketing under the free speech and federalism provi-
sions of the Constitution.1 I am also thinking of the efforts of the Se-
curities and Exchange Commission and the Office of Thrift Supervi-
sion to better align the professional commitment to confidentiality 
with the public values reflected in fraud and misrepresentation doc-
trine.2 
 Nevertheless, we are especially sensitive these days to the limita-
tions of state institutions as regulatory actors. And indeed, state in-
stitutions have been complicit in the regulatory abuses I attribute to 
the bar. The bar’s exercise of its monopoly power has depended on 
ratification by state judiciaries and legislatures. The kernel of plau-
sibility in the idea of self-regulation is the implication that the state 
is too remote, inflexible, and compromised to provide the full range of 
institutional support for the idealistic aspects of legal professional-
ism. Moreover, the state is itself a monopolistic organization. To the 
extent that the objections to the institutional premise of traditional 
professionalism rest on its monopolistic rather than its private char-
acter, it seems most promising to consider non-monopolistic ap-
proaches, both public and private. 
 That is my plan. I first elaborate on the widely felt doubts about 
monopolistic self-regulation. Then I consider the possibility of non-
monopolistic regimes for two of the most important areas—
certification for practice and professional discipline. 
I.   THE TRADITIONAL STRUCTURE 
 I should explain what I mean by monopolistic self-regulation and, 
indeed, what I mean when I ask “Who Needs the Bar?” It may not be 
immediately obvious what one means by “the bar” in the American 
context. 
 The notion of self-regulation in the traditional conception is that 
practitioners organize in a single collectivity to promulgate and en-
                                                                                                                    
 1. See infra note 5. 
 2. See In re Gutfreund, Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 85,067 (Dec. 3, 1992); In re Carter 
& Johnson, Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 82,847 (Feb. 28, 1981); William H. Simon, The Kaye 
Scholer Affair: The Lawyer’s Duty of Candor and the Bar’s Temptations of Evasion and 
Apology, 23 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 243 (1998) (discussing the Office of Thrift Supervision ef-
forts to discipline lawyers in the Savings and Loan scandal). 
2003]                          WHO NEEDS THE BAR? 641 
 
force norms of good practice.3 Now, of course, no such organization 
has ever existed in the United States. The American model departs 
from the theoretical paradigm in two respects. First, the remission of 
primary regulatory authority over lawyers to the states means that, 
instead of a single over-arching association, we have more than fifty 
separate sets of regulatory institutions. Second, our constitutional 
arrangements forbid explicit delegation of regulatory power to pri-
vate organizations. Thus, regulatory power at the state level resides 
formally, not in organizations openly controlled by practitioners, but 
in public institutions, most notably the judiciary. 
 Nevertheless, the image of the bar as a monopolistic self-
regulatory organization has some descriptive power. Our arrange-
ments are more complex, but their output looks very much like what 
one would expect of the private monopolistic paradigm. Most of the 
ethics rules adopted by our many jurisdictions are quite similar. 
These rules in turn resemble those promulgated by the American Bar 
Association (“ABA”), a private organization that is the closest we 
come to a national lawyers’ collective. The ABA aspires to represent 
the entire bar and in fact includes more than a third of it. 
 Moreover, within each state, organizations of practitioners have 
powerful influence over admissions and professional responsibility 
regulation. The “integrated” bars include all practitioners within the 
state and often have explicitly delegated powers (subject to judicial 
oversight). In states without integrated bars, inclusive voluntary bar 
associations that purport to speak for practitioners throughout the 
state play a strong role in both admissions and ethics rule-making 
and enforcement. 
 The political structure of the states would seem to make judges 
responsive to organized practitioners. Most state judges run for office 
in elections in which the average voter has little information or in-
terest. Often, local practitioners will be the largest constituency with 
enough information or incentive to take an interest. 
 The legitimacy of this regulatory structure is currently under 
tremendous pressure. The pressure arises from two basic problems. 
The first problem is that this structure gives major influence to a 
group with a strong conflict of interest. This seems most apparent 
with respect to admission and marketing practices. The bar’s norms 
have restricted admission and inhibited price and service competi-
tion. The bar has public rationales for these norms, but since a sub-
stantial range of its members have a selfish interest in them, non-
lawyers tend to be skeptical.  
                                                                                                                    
 3. E.g., EMILE DURKHEIM, PROFESSIONAL ETHICS AND CIVIC MORALS (Cornelia 
Brookfield trans., 1957); A.M. Carr-Saunders, Professions, in 12 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE 
SOC. SCI. 476 (1934). 
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 There are other grounds for this skepticism. Bar leaders are occa-
sionally caught discussing the admission and marketing restrictions 
more or less openly as devices for insuring the economic welfare of 
incumbent practitioners.4 Further ground for doubt appears when we 
consider that, while these rules depend on controversial empirical 
assumptions, the bar has never shown any interest in investigating 
them. Would easier admission requirements—say two years of law 
school instead of three—really lead to lower quality practice? Would 
client interests be jeopardized if lawyers could practice with 
nonlawyer partners? Would deterrence of illegality be decreased or 
enhanced if confidentiality was cut back? The bar’s rules have been 
premised for centuries on empirical assumptions about such matters, 
but there is almost no research on any of them. The American Bar 
Association supports an excellent research institution—the American 
Bar Foundation—but it has never done any research on the factual 
premises of the profession’s core commitments. 
 The recent history of federal court review of state exclusionary 
practices in response to constitutional challenges is instructive and 
troubling. The challenged practices include citizenship requirements, 
residence requirements, in-state office requirements, requirements of 
association with local counsel, and a panoply of restrictions on adver-
tising and solicitation. When the courts demand more than minimal 
rationality, the bar loses.5 The courts demand more when the prac-
tice impinges directly on an important federalism or free speech 
value. In such situations, the bar must offer more than fanciful 
speculation suggesting that there might be some legitimate policy 
                                                                                                                    
 4. Hoover v. Ronwin, 466 U.S. 558 (1984) (dismissing antitrust claim against Ari-
zona based on such allegations under state action exemption). 
 5. Peel v. Attorney Registration & Disciplinary Comm’n, 496 U.S. 91 (1990) (holding 
advertising prohibition to violate First Amendment); Supreme Court of Va. v. Friedman, 
487 U.S. 59 (1988) (stating that the limitation of “on motion” admission without bar exam 
to residents violates privileges and immunities clause); Shapero v. Ky. Bar Ass’n, 486 U.S. 
466 (1988) (holding advertising prohibition to violate First Amendment); Frazier v. Heebe, 
482 U.S. 641 (1987) (stating that in-state office requirement for only non-residents violates 
privileges and immunities clause); Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 629 
(1985) (holding advertising prohibition to violate First Amendment); Supreme Court of 
N.H. v. Piper, 470 U.S. 274 (1985) (stating that the exclusion of non-residents violates the 
privileges and immunities clause); In re R.M.J., 455 U.S. 191 (1982) (holding advertising 
prohibition to violate First Amendment); In re Primus, 436 U.S. 412 (1978) (holding solici-
tation prohibition to violate First Amendment); Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350 
(1977) (holding advertising prohibition to violate First Amendment); In re Griffiths, 413 
U.S. 717 (1973) (stating that the exclusion of aliens violates equal protection clause); Baird 
v. State Bar of Ariz., 401 U.S. 1 (1971) (stating that the requirement of submission to 
broad examination of political associations violates First Amendment); In re Stolar, 401 
U.S. 23 (1971); Konigsberg v. State Bar of Cal., 353 U.S. 252 (1957) (holding exclusion on 
the basis of Communist Party membership and radical political activities violates First 
Amendment); Schware v. Bd. of Bar Exm’rs, 353 U.S. 232 (1957) (holding exclusion on the 
basis of Communist Party membership and radical political activities violates First 
Amendment). 
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that under some not-totally-ridiculous but completely hypothetical 
scenario would be rationally served by the rule. The courts demand a 
policy with substantial plausibility and factual premises with some 
empirical support. The bar almost always fails to deliver.6  
 When the values harmed by the practice are less constitutionally 
salient, courts apply minimum rationality. Only a failure of imagina-
tion could lead to flunking this test. When the bar justifies its re-
quirement that out-of-state lawyers affiliate with local counsel in 
state court, even in cases under federal law, as a means of insuring 
familiarity with local procedural rules, the courts accept this as 
minimally rational.7 When the bar justifies its requirement that its 
members have in-state offices as a means of assuring availability to 
clients, this too will pass the test.8 
 These conclusions may follow from the minimum rationality stan-
dard, but we should not ignore the layers of implausibility this stan-
dard by-passes. First, the connections between local admission and 
knowledge of local rules and between an in-state office and accessibil-
ity to clients are minor and wildly imprecise. It is likely that nearly 
all practitioners affected by the exclusions would have learned the lo-
cal rules and made themselves accessible without having to under-
take the expense of associating with a second lawyer or opening an 
in-state office.  
 Second, whatever benefits the exclusionary rules produce for cli-
ents have to be weighed against the costs they impose, which are ul-
timately borne by clients. The requirements raise the cost of lawyers 
and reduce client choice among them. The bar, of course, makes its 
                                                                                                                    
 6. The Court did hold a speculative rationale—the likelihood of undue pressure from 
in-person solicitation—sufficient for more than minimal scrutiny in Ohralik v. Ohio State 
Bar Ass’n, 436 U.S. 447 (1978). The only Supreme Court case I am aware of in which the 
bar actually produced evidence that the Court deemed sufficient to satisfy greater-than-
minimal scrutiny is Florida Bar v. Went For It, Inc., 515 U.S. 618 (1995). The evidence, 
however, did not indicate that the advertising was harmful to clients, merely that it nega-
tively affected “public perceptions” of the bar. The Court’s acceptance of this effect as a ba-
sis for a restriction of protected speech seems inconsistent with basic First Amendment 
principles. See Am. Booksellers’ Ass’n v. Hudnut, 771 F.2d 323 (7th Cir. 1985) (stating in 
the course of invalidating a pornography ordinance, that the tendency of the speech to in-
duce negative perceptions of women is not a legitimate basis for regulation under the First 
Amendment). 
 The Court also accepted the bar’s rationale that current Communist political associations 
have some connection to fitness to practice law. See Law Students Civil Rights Research 
Council v. Wadmond, 401 U.S. 154 (1971); In re Anastaplo, 366 U.S. 82 (1961); Konigsberg 
v. State Bar of Cal., 366 U.S. 36 (1961). But such inquiries are rarely pursued today, and 
at least one bar has come to regret the activities held permissible by the Court. David 
Rani, 30 Years Have Passed But License Still Sought, NAT’L L.J., Aug. 22, 1983, at 8 (re-
porting that the Illinois State Bar Association petitioned the state supreme court to recon-
sider the 30-year old decision upheld in In re Anastaplo). 
 7. Ford v. Israel, 701 F.2d 689, 692 (7th Cir. 1983) (stating that the rule has “the air 
of a guild restriction” but satisfies minimum rationality). 
 8. Tolchin v. Supreme Court of the State of N.J., 111 F.3d 1099 (3d Cir. 1997). 
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decisions without any information on the comparative magnitudes of 
the costs and benefits.  
 Third, in all such cases the bar has a choice of two approaches to 
dealing with the problem. It can deal with them prophylactically by 
excluding people or restricting practices it perceives have a tendency 
to harm clients. Or it can deal with the problem through after-the-
fact sanctioning of bad practice. Lawyers who fail to comply with lo-
cal court rules or to make themselves available to clients can be pe-
nalized. Thus, a plausible decision to adopt the exclusions would not 
only have to weigh the costs and benefits of the exclusions, but also 
compare them against the alternative of increasing after-the-fact en-
forcement. Of course, the bar does not do this, at least not explicitly 
and systematically. The bar’s conflict of interest is severe here, since 
the costs of exclusion are borne by outsiders, while after-the-fact en-
forcement sanctions members. And in fact, the indications are that 
after-the-fact enforcement tends to be indulgent and lax.9 
 The second source of pressure on the traditional regulatory model 
is the increased difficulty of formulating any principled delineation of 
the professional monopoly. Our version of the traditional model re-
quires both that we distinguish law practice from non-law practice 
and that we assign particular instances of practice to particular 
states. It gets harder every day to do either. Substantively, the bar is 
hard pressed to explain why what lawyers can do in tax counseling is 
or should be different from what accountants do, or why what law-
yers can do in conveyancing is different or should be different from 
what brokers and lay title searchers do. Even in litigation, once 
within the paradigmatic core of the lawyering field, we find lay me-
diators performing work that is hard to distinguish from that which 
lawyers do. In the areas that the federal agencies have opened to lay 
practice—patents, immigration, and tax—lay practitioners have 
flourished alongside lawyers.  
 The other aspect of the problem is the increasing extent to which 
practice is either federal or multi-jurisdictional. The typical practice 
of large firm business lawyers involves the law of numerous states 
and requires travel to many states where they are not licensed. It is 
commonly said that lawyers for large businesses routinely engage in 
unauthorized practice, and under the stricter definitions of unau-
thorized practice, this is certainly true. But a more fundamental con-
cern is the difficulty of formulating any coherent definition of intra-
state practice that embraces any significant range of lawyering. 
 How do we decide in what state or states a particular act of 
lawyering takes place? Clearly, the source of the relevant law is no 
                                                                                                                    
 9. DEBORAH L. RHODE, IN THE INTERESTS OF JUSTICE: REFORMING THE LEGAL 
PROFESSION 158-65 (2000). 
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longer a plausible touchstone. It is too late in the day to say that a 
lawyer needs to be a member of the bar of any state whose law she 
gives advice about. Most experts on Delaware corporate law are not 
members of the Delaware bar. They are scattered throughout the 
country, the largest group of them being in New York. A broad range 
of lawyering tasks require consideration of the law of many jurisdic-
tions. No one suggests that a national securities offering requires 
that fifty different lawyers give opinions on their respective states’ 
“blue sky” laws. Nor has there been a recommendation that a na-
tional publication needs to get its advice on libel from lawyers li-
censed in all of the jurisdictions where its product is distributed. 
And, of course, with respect to federal law, no state could claim that 
its lawyers are presumptively more qualified than out-of-state law-
yers. 
 Recognizing this, the regulators are driven to focus on “presence” 
and “contacts.”10 But most physical contacts are relevant only be-
cause they implicate some relevant law. Surely there is no reason, 
other than that its law applies, for New Jersey to think that its own 
practitioners are better qualified to do conveyances of in-state real 
estate. 
 The one kind of contact or presence that might reflect a distinct 
state interest is the residence of the client. A state might decide that 
it had a special responsibility to protect its residents from bad 
lawyering, regardless of what law applied to the problem in question. 
But current doctrine is generally not consistent with such a policy. In 
litigation, we apply the disciplinary rule of the place where the court 
sits rather than the residence of the parties. In transactional work, 
the key factor is the state where the lawyer is licensed.11 
 Moreover, the residence rationale fails to explain regulation of in-
state practice on behalf of non-resident clients. The New Jersey bar 
insists, for example, that lawyers practicing in New Jersey maintain 
a “bona fide” office within the state. It enforces this rule zealously 
against lawyers based in Philadelphia who seek to represent clients 
in New Jersey. The principal rationale for the rule is that an in-state 
office assures that the lawyer will be available to clients. In fact, 
however, it appears that most of the clients served by the Philadel-
phia-based lawyers are Pennsylvania residents—banks that do lend-
                                                                                                                    
 10. Birbrower, Montalbano, Condon & Frank v. Superior Court, 949 P.2d 1, 5 (Cal. 
1998) (analyzing whether there is “sufficient contact” with California to make practice by 
non-member unauthorized primarily but not exclusively in terms of physical links); AM. 
BAR ASS’N, REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON MULTIJURISDICTIONAL PRACTICE 16 (Aug. 
2002), available at http//:www.abanet.org/cpr/mjp/final_mjp_rpt_5-17.pdf (proposing a new 
prohibition on unauthorized practice that precludes establishing a “systematic and con-
tinuous presence” in a jurisdiction where the lawyer is not licensed) (last visited May 12, 
2003) (on file with author).  
 11. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 8.5 (2001). 
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ing in New Jersey—who are best served by the lawyers’ out-of-state 
offices.12 
 Note that the two aspects of the boundary problem push the bar in 
opposite directions. The bar’s response to the fact that nonlawyers 
practice competently in particular fields is to emphasize lawyers’ 
competence in broad skills of complex analysis that cut across fields. 
Thus, it is the general analytical skills of lawyers that are said to be 
the comparative advantage that they have over nonlawyers. This is 
the general view of the ethics codes. The Model Code of Professional 
Responsibility, conceding that lay practitioners may be able to apply 
law in specialized fields, asserts that what lawyers have that lay 
practitioners do not is “professional judgment.” It defines “profes-
sional judgment” as the “educated ability to relate the general body 
and philosophy of the law to a specific legal problem of a client.”13 
And the Model Rules assert that it is fine for lawyers to accept em-
ployment in an area in which they are unprepared, so long as they 
intend to study up on it.14 The assumption is that lawyers are certi-
fied, not for knowledge of specific rules, but for a general aptitude 
that covers any legal field. 
 By contrast, the response to the jurisdictional aspect of the prob-
lem is to emphasize the importance of particular competence in local 
law. Thus, we are told that the reason out-of-state lawyers must af-
filiate with local counsel to appear pro hac vice in many state courts, 
and even some federal courts, is that in-state lawyers have better 
knowledge of local rules.15 A lawyer in any state is free to take on the 
most complicated tax or securities matter without demonstrating any 
prior knowledge of these bodies of law. But fear that lawyers might 
not be able to master a handful of unfamiliar procedural rules is said 
to warrant an exclusion that imposes substantial burdens and ex-
penses. 
 It is difficult to see how the bar can have it both ways. If the “es-
sence” of lawyering is, as the Model Code of Professional Responsibil-
ity asserts, “the ability to relate the general body and philosophy of 
law to a specific legal problem,”16 then there is no reason why lawyers 
                                                                                                                    
 12. Charles Toutant, N.J. Court Panel Balks at Shared Bona Fide Office, N.J. L.J., 
Oct. 29, 2001, at 1, 14. 
 13. MODEL CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY EC 3-5 (1981); see also MODEL RULES OF 
PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.1 cmt., para. 2 (2001): “Perhaps the most fundamental legal skill 
consists of determining what kind of legal problems a situation may involve, a skill that 
necessarily transcends any particular specialized knowledge.”  
 14. “A lawyer need not necessarily have special training or prior experience to handle 
legal problems of a type with which the lawyer is unfamiliar. . . . A lawyer can provide ade-
quate representation in a wholly novel field through necessary study.” MODEL RULES OF 
PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.1 cmt., para. 2 (2001). 
 15. E.g., Ford v. Israel, 701 F.2d 689, 692 (7th Cir. 1983). 
 16. MODEL CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY EC 3-5 (1981). 
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should be required to demonstrate knowledge of any particular body 
of law. On the other hand, if law is just a series of discrete special-
ties, then it is hard to distinguish what lawyers do within those spe-
cialties from what experienced nonlawyer practitioners do, and hence 
hard to explain why they should or could have an exclusive right to a 
certain scope of practice. 
 A striking fact of recent history is the increasing homogenization 
of legal education and the admissions process. The trend in bar ex-
aminations for many decades has been away from testing local law to 
testing general principles. National law schools consider it beneath 
them to give systematic instruction in the law of any given jurisdic-
tion. In most states, the Multistate Bar Exam counts for half or more 
of an applicant’s score. Even the essay portions test mostly general 
principles. For example, California, one of the most exclusive juris-
dictions with a low bar pass-rate and almost no waive-in opportuni-
ties, tests virtually no local law. Review courses for the California 
bar typically tell the student what the “prevalent view is,” and what 
the “minority view” is; a star performer on the exam may have no 
idea what the California view is on most of the questions tested. 
 In this situation, it is difficult to take seriously the idea that a 
member of a particular state’s bar can be presumed to have a better 
knowledge of its law—the principal rationale for the exclusion of out-
of-state lawyers.17  
 The recent report of the ABA Commission on Multijurisdictional 
Practice comes as close as possible to acknowledging the bankruptcy 
of monopolistic regulation without abandoning it. “[T]here is no evi-
dence,” the report concludes, that unauthorized practice in one state 
by lawyers licensed in another “result[s] in the provision of incompe-
tent representation.”18 Nevertheless, the Commission endorses the 
clarification and re-affirmation of unauthorized practice prohibitions 
for no better reason than that “a large segment of the bar” supports 
it.19 
                                                                                                                    
 17. The ABA’s Commission on Multijurisdictional Practice mentions two other ration-
ales for exclusion—the possibility that members of a state’s bar will have better knowledge 
of unwritten local customs that are relevant to effective practice and that members will be 
more likely to engage in in-state pro bono activity. See AM. BAR ASS’N, supra note 10, at 9. 
These rationales were held insufficient to justify residence requirements against federal-
ism-based constitutional challenges. See, e.g., Supreme Court of N.H. v. Piper, 470 U.S. 
274 (1985). Since the only remaining major entry barrier—the bar exam—is probably sub-
ject to a more deferential constitutional test, these rationales may be sufficient for that 
purpose, but it is doubtful that they could survive disinterested, critical examination. The 
bar exam has only the most speculative and attenuated relation to either goal, and if the 
bar were serious about either, it could pursue them more effectively at less cost by testing 
knowledge of local practice on the exam and by setting minimum pro bono requirements. 
 18. See Am. Bar Ass’n, supra note 10, at 6. 
 19. Id. The Report’s full explanation of its recommendation reads: 
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 If the bar were a private organization, its practices would be 
struck down under the antitrust laws. What legitimacy they have is 
due to their adoption by the state courts. But the courts seem to have 
been a weak check on the economic self-seeking we readily impute to 
private monopolists. They have no accountability to out-of-state in-
terests. Within the state, it seems at least possible that they will be 
more sensitive to the interests of highly organized practitioners than 
to the more diffuse interests of clients. And the fact that the courts 
have tended to more or less rubber stamp the output of the ABA and 
the state associations strengthens such doubts. 
 So it seems promising to consider competitive approaches to regu-
lation. I focus on two of the most important areas—admissions and 
professional discipline. I consider an approach to admissions that in-
volves competition among public authorities, and an approach to dis-
cipline that involves competition among private associations. But 
there are many possible variations on each proposal, involving differ-
ent mixes of public and private institutions. 
II.   A COMPETITIVE ADMISSIONS REGIME 
 Given the large extent to which practice involves federal law and 
multi-state relationships, the case for federalization of lawyer regula-
tion is a strong one. But the state-based regime might look more at-
tractive if it were shorn of its monopolistic elements. At least, it is 
worth considering what a non-monopolistic regime of admissions 
would look like.  
 Some invoke the analogy of the driver’s license in discussing such 
a regime. Taken literally, the analogy connotes a regime in which 
each state accords those licensed in other states all the privileges ac-
corded by the licensing state without imposing any additional quali-
fying conditions. No one proposes to go this far with lawyers, how-
ever; nearly all proposals contemplate some local requirements.20 
                                                                                                                    
Given the principle of state-based judicial regulation of the legal profession, the 
assumptions underlying that principle, and the support of a large segment of 
the bar for preserving it, the Commission believes that a stronger case would 
have to be made that national law practice is essential and that a more meas-
ured approach will not suffice to facilitate law practice and to promote the pub-
lic interest. 
 Although this may sound like three reasons, it is only one. In the conceded absence of 
“evidence,” the “principle” of state monopolization and its underlying assumptions carry no 
more weight than the competing principle of freedom of contract and its underlying as-
sumptions. The conclusion thus rests only on the “support” of the bar. Note also how the 
Commission, having failed to come up with any evidence to support the bar’s predisposi-
tion, insists without explanation that the burden of proof be placed on those who challenge 
it. 
 20. Christine R. Davis, Comment, Approaching Reform: The Future of Multijurisdic-
tional Practice in Today’s Legal Profession, 29 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1339, 1357-66 (2002). 
Most proposals contemplate at least summary registration with the possibility of suspen-
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 I find it useful to consider lawyer regulation in the light of an-
other federalist analogy—corporate chartering. The corporate char-
tering regime involves a measure of reserved local power over out-of-
state licensees that seems closer to what reformers contemplate for 
the legal profession. Moreover, a large literature on corporate char-
tering has sensitized us to the potential advantages of competitive 
state regulation in this area.21  
 Finally, the corporate regime is also interesting because the Su-
preme Court has indicated that the Constitution limits monopolistic 
regulation in this area.22 The Court summarily rejected suggestions 
that there are comparable limits on monopolistic regulation of the le-
gal profession, but the arguments for Constitutional limitation seems 
at least as strong with the legal profession, and the Court may some 
day reconsider its casually-taken prior position.23  
 To an even greater extent than the legal profession, businesses 
that assume the corporate form have become increasingly multistate 
and increasingly subject to federal regulation. Yet, here, as with law 
and other occupations, our system has not moved toward federaliza-
tion of the basic regulatory regime. The states retain primary re-
sponsibility for corporate chartering. Yet, the corporate model is one 
of competitive rather than monopolistic federalism. 
 In this model, each state permits corporations chartered by other 
states to conduct business within the state, subject to conditions tai-
                                                                                                                    
sion or revocation of the right to practice locally for in-state disciplinary violations. The 
European Union has such a system. American states that permit summary registration of 
attorneys licensed out-of-state typically condition registration on some period of practice in 
the licensing state and on licensing state reciprocity toward its own lawyers. 
 21. See Roberta Romano, The State Competition Debate in Corporate Law, 8 CARDOZO 
L. REV. 709 (1987). 
 22. Edgar v. MITE, 457 U.S. 624 (1982).  
 23. The authority is sparse and ambiguous. In Norfolk & Western Railroad Co. v. 
Beatty, 423 U.S. 1009 (1975), aff’g mem. 400 F. Supp. 234 (S.D. Ill. 1975), the Court sum-
marily affirmed a district court opinion suggesting there are no constitutional limits on 
state court decisions regarding admission pro hac vice in cases involving federal rights. In 
Leis v. Flynt, 439 U.S. 438 (1979), it rejected another constitutional challenge to a state 
court denial of admission pro hac vice in a case involving federal rights. The Court’s opin-
ion in Leis focuses on and rejects the claim that the lawyer has a federal constitutional 
right to state court admission pro hac vice. It addresses the more important claim of 
whether the claimant (client) has a right to have the attorney of his choice admitted only in 
a brief response to a dissenting opinion with a conclusory reference to the Norfolk & West-
ern opinion. The dissent in Leis had invoked the contention in a Second Circuit opinion by 
Judge Friendly that “under the privileges and immunities clause of the Constitution no 
state can prohibit a citizen with a federal claim or defense from engaging an out-of-state 
lawyer to collaborate with an in-state lawyer and give legal advice concerning it within the 
state.” Spanos v. Skouras Theatres Corp., 364 F.2d 161, 170 (2d Cir. 1966). 
 Where the client is not asserting a federal right, the constitutional claim would be that 
the restriction unreasonably burdens interstate commerce, as in Edgar v. MITE. However, 
given the Court’s deference to state regulatory interests in the Norfolk & Western and Leis 
cases and in occupational regulation cases in general, the prospects of such a claim seem 
dim. 
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lored to local needs. These conditions are usually minimal. The for-
eign corporation must pay fees and subject itself to suit in the state’s 
courts. Most states demand little more. In particular, while the 
states apply local law to the local activities of the corporation that af-
fect outsiders to the corporation, they tend to defer to the chartering 
state in enforcing protections for shareholders.24  
 A few, however,—notably California and New York—do.25 They 
impose some restrictions from their own corporate law designed to 
protect local shareholders. These provisions are narrowly tailored, 
however. Only a few provisions deemed important are imposed, and 
they are limited to corporations whose investors and/or operations 
are concentrated within the state. Moreover, they typically exempt 
publicly traded corporations, without regard to whether their share-
holders are concentrated within the state. The Supreme Court has 
interpreted the commerce and privileges-and-immunities clauses of 
the Constitution to preclude the states from going much farther than 
this. But most states have seen no need to approach the limits of con-
stitutional power in this matter. Thus, within the typical state, the 
protection accorded in-state corporate shareholders in a foreign cor-
poration is usually the law of the chartering state. 
 Although many would prefer a regime of federal chartering, there 
is an argument that a competitive federal regime has an advantage 
over a national one. If corporate promoters or managers have a 
choice of regimes and if shareholders are sensitive to the variations 
among them, then promoters or managers have a reason to seek out 
regimes that shareholders regard as superior. A solid legal regime 
increases the value of the corporation to shareholders and hence the 
price they are willing to pay for shares. State governments desiring 
to attract incorporations, in order to get revenues or prestige, will 
have reasons to make their protections of shareholders effective, and 
the competitive process will penalize those who fail. The extent to 
which the process functions this way is controversial, but the corpo-
rate chartering regime clearly enjoys considerably more legitimacy 
and respect than the very different state-based regime of lawyer li-
censing. 
 There is one element of the current regulatory regime for lawyers 
that corresponds to the corporate regime. In professional responsibil-
ity cases, states adopt a choice-of-law approach that looks to the li-
censing state’s norms for most purposes.26 However, since states ex-
                                                                                                                    
 24. HARRY G. HENN & JOHN R. ALEXANDER, LAWS OF CORPORATIONS 229-35 (3d ed. 
1983). 
 25. Id. at 189-99. 
 26. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 8.5 (2001). The main exception is for litiga-
tion practice, where the jurisdiction in which the court sits controls. Id. Note that, to the 
extent that the choice of law rule looks to the licensing state’s norms with respect, not just 
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tensively prohibit in-state practice by foreign lawyers, the choice-of-
law norm is of limited importance. We can easily imagine, however, a 
lawyer regime developed along the corporate chartering model.  
 In it, each state would be obliged to permit lawyers licensed by 
other states to practice within the state subject to narrowly tailored 
restrictions designed to protect specifically identified local interests. 
It would, for example, be appropriate to require foreign lawyers, like 
foreign corporations, to consent to the adjudication of claims by local 
citizens before local tribunals. It would be appropriate to require 
minimum levels of liability insurance coverage. And a state might 
require special qualification by way of study or examination, but only 
with respect to genuinely local practice.  
 Thus, for example, it might in theory be appropriate to require, as 
a condition of practicing conveyancing or divorce within the state, an 
exam focused on the particular subject in question. I say “in theory” 
because, in fact, I doubt if most states, acting in good faith, would 
find any need for such protections, just as most do not find any need 
for specific protections for local shareholders of foreign corporations. 
After all, under the current regime, states do not condition the right 
to practice in most areas on specific testing in these areas. Many lo-
cal practice areas are not tested at all on the bar exams, and none 
are tested more than cursorily. Nevertheless, restricting conditions 
to those focused on local matters in this manner would focus regula-
tion on the areas of at least potentially legitimate state interest. 
Moreover, it is possible that testing focused on specific areas of prac-
tice in which the particular lawyers are about to engage would in-
duce more valuable preparation than the once-over-lightly approach 
of the current exams. 
 In the competitive federalist regime, consumers within each state 
would face a choice of lawyers licensed in many different states for 
most services. Lawyers would be required to make clear at the outset 
where they had been licensed. The market might develop so that con-
sumers could usefully take account of variations in state certification 
regimes. Some states might acquire a reputation for especially high 
general standards; some might acquire reputations for effective em-
phasis on certain areas of practice. Some states might compete to be-
come the premier national brand, like Delaware in corporate law. 
Other states might focus on perceived local needs. A rural state like 
North Dakota, for example, might focus on small business skills. One 
could imagine that Florida might focus on estate planning, among 
other subjects. 
                                                                                                                    
to the protection of clients, but to the protection of third parties, it goes beyond the corre-
sponding corporate norm, and is, I would submit, unjustifiable. 
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 To the extent that state certifications send useful but varying sig-
nals about lawyer quality and preparation, there is every reason to 
think that sophisticated clients would be able to take account of such 
information. Even unsophisticated clients might, with the help of 
consumer rating services, be able to make meaningful distinctions 
among different regimes. The legal needs of unsophisticated clients 
tend to fall predominantly in a small number of categories, such as 
personal injury, divorce, and estate planning. Cross-state compari-
sons in quality of training might yield information that would be ac-
cessible to consumers.  
 No doubt some will fear a “race to the bottom” in which some 
states try to earn revenues by certifying poorly qualified candidates 
under easy standards and then export them to prey on out-of-staters. 
But reputation would seem a strong obstacle to this course in two re-
spects. First, consumers would shy away from lawyers certified in 
the low-standards jurisdictions. Second, the better-qualified local 
practitioners in the low-standards state would feel degraded by the 
poor reputation of the local bar, and would likely push to change it.  
 If a state found that its citizens were victimized by low-quality 
foreign practitioners, it could, as I have suggested, act by establish-
ing local standards with respect to genuinely local issues. But the re-
strictions ought to be narrowly tailored to clearly identified local in-
terests. 
III.   A COMPETITIVE DISCIPLINARY REGIME27 
 Turn now to the ethical rules that protect third party and public 
interests. Critics within the profession, and most lay people, consider 
that the bar’s rules on confidentiality and zealous advocacy exces-
sively sacrifice third party and public interests to client interests. 
They require or permit lawyers to withhold material information in 
situations where withholding may contribute to substantial injustice, 
and they even require or permit lawyers to actively obfuscate in some 
circumstances, for example, attempting to discredit witnesses they 
know are testifying truthfully. 
 While the general public seems not to share the bar’s commitment 
to strict confidentiality and aggressive advocacy, these rules are less 
often seen as an expression of economic self-interest than the rules 
specifically focused on admission and marketing. Critics are as likely 
to explain the bar’s ethical orientation in terms of ideological com-
mitments as in terms of economic self-interest. 
                                                                                                                    
 27. Here I draw on some suggestions I made in WILLIAM H. SIMON, THE PRACTICE OF 
JUSTICE: A THEORY OF LAWYERS’ ETHICS 202-14 (1998). See also Richard W. Painter, Rules 
Lawyers Play By, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 665 (2001). 
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 And in fact, the bar’s economic interests are ambiguous. On the 
one hand, strong confidentiality and aggressive advocacy enable law-
yers to promise prospective clients that they will pursue their inter-
ests aggressively, even at the cost of injustice to others. This 
undoubtedly appeals to many clients. On the other hand, these 
norms may impair lawyers’ ability to serve other clients. Much of 
what lawyers do involves efforts to induce either state officials or 
private third parties to rely on their clients—that is to credit their 
claims and assertions or to trust them enough to enter into relations 
of mutual dependence with them. Strong confidentiality and advo-
cacy norms limit such efforts. The client of the lawyer who adopts an 
ethic of minimal third party and public responsibility will pay a price 
in terms of diminished trust by third parties and officials. The client 
gets the benefit of zealous advocacy relatively unconstrained by 
commitment to anything but the unambiguous commands of the 
positive law. But she may experience more wariness on the part of 
the people she is dealing with. These people may be inclined to insist 
on more substantiation of factual representation or more specifica-
tion of contractual terms to protect against the higher danger of op-
portunism from the client who opts for low commitment ethics. In 
marginal cases, private parties may refuse to enter into relationships 
that would enter with a higher degree of trust, and public officials 
may exercise their discretion against the client simply because they 
feel unable to credit the lawyer’s representations.  
 So, it is less clear whether the ethics rules reflect economic self-
interest. Nevertheless, as with the admission and marketing rules, 
the ethics rules rest on debatable empirical assumptions that the bar 
tends not to analyze rigorously and has never sought to investigate 
factually. For example, does strong confidentiality promote compli-
ance with law by inducing more disclosure to lawyers, thus enabling 
lawyers to give advice that encourages compliance? Or does it un-
dermine compliance by reducing disclosure by lawyers, thus depriv-
ing lawyers of leverage to induce compliance and precluding enforc-
ers from acting on the information? Obviously, the rule must have 
both effects. It increases compliance in some cases by increasing dis-
closure to lawyers, and it reduces compliance in others by reducing 
disclosure by lawyers. Whether strong confidentiality is legitimate 
depends on which effect is greater. But the bar’s premise that the 
pro-compliance effect dominates is based on nothing more than faith. 
It has no evidence on the matter and has never sought to acquire 
any. 
 One of the virtues of a competitive regime is that it would enable 
us to observe and compare the effects of alternative regimes. Regula-
tors would have a range of information on effects that they do not 
now have. 
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 Let us try to imagine what a competitive regime would look like 
with respect to such rules. Where the lawyer negotiates on behalf of 
clients with third parties, the parties might agree contractually to 
adopt a particular set of ethical rules for the transaction. When the 
lawyer appears before a tribunal or agency, she might simply indi-
cate to the tribunal or agency what level of ethical responsibilities to 
the tribunal or agency she was committing herself to. Some lawyers 
might opt for the current regime of the ABA rules, with its low level 
of commitment to third-party and public interests. Others might opt 
for ethics reflecting a high level of commitment to third party and 
public interests, one requiring them to volunteer material informa-
tion, for example. 
 In this way, individual lawyers could tailor their ethical commit-
ments to particular clients or clienteles, and third parties could ad-
just accordingly. Moreover, one can imagine tribunals and agencies 
might adjust their conduct in accordance with an advocate’s level of 
commitment. Judges would be less apt to accept the informal assur-
ances of low-commitment lawyers, and more wary about drawing in-
ferences from their presentations at trial. Agencies might focus more 
enforcement resources on verifying the presentations of low-
commitment lawyers. The IRS, for example, might consider the level 
of ethical commitment of a taxpayer’s preparer or advisor in allocat-
ing its auditing resources. 
 If it could work, such a regime would be both efficient and fair. It 
would be efficient because it would enable those with whom the law-
yer deals to allocate their efforts to counter deception and opportun-
ism more rationally. They would have better information about the 
degree to which they could plausibly trust a lawyer or correspond-
ingly the degree to which they should devote resources toward pro-
tection against opportunism. It would be fair because it would facili-
tate protective and enforcement activity in ways that would better 
vindicate the substantive law. Deception and opportunism would 
succeed less often, which would enhance fairness. Clients of low-
commitment lawyers would pay the price of increased wariness, but 
this seems entirely fair. The current situation in which lawyers are 
presumed to commit only to a low level of third-party obligation is 
unfair to clients who would be willing to bind themselves to a higher 
level. They currently pay a penalty because it is harder to distinguish 
them from low-commitment clients. A competitive regime would 
remedy this unfairness. Each client would receive the level of trust 
appropriate to the ethical commitment she was willing to make. 
 If such a regime would be both efficient and fair, you might ask 
why we do not have it already. The current regime does not preclude 
private parties from contracting for a higher level of ethical commit-
ment than the minimum one required by the ABA rules, and many 
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tribunals and agencies would have the power to enact rules forcing 
lawyers who practice before them to declare the level of commitment 
they would commit to. In fact, we do occasionally see private con-
tracts over such matters as disclosures. Think, for example, of a “10b-
5 opinion” in a securities dealing, in which the lawyer warrants that, 
as far as she knows, no material information has been withheld. 
Nevertheless, we see little of this kind of activity.  
 There are a variety of reasons why such a regime has not arisen, 
even though it might be efficient and fair. Let me mention three 
problems, each of which might be remediable through public-spirited 
intervention. 
 First, issues of ethical commitment may be part of the category of 
issues research suggests that psychological inhibitions impede people 
from recognizing and raising. Summarizing some of this literature, 
Melvin Eisenberg suggests that people may not negotiate contractual 
safeguards against opportunism because they tend to be overly opti-
mistic and insensitive to remote, hypothetical contingencies.28 Ethical 
issues also have an emotional charge that may generate anxiety. Be-
cause to doubt someone’s ethics is sometimes taken as a negative 
judgment on her character, a person may feel that simply raising the 
issue of ethical commitment will be perceived by the other as offen-
sive. 
 The second problem arises from the costs of communicating about, 
negotiating, and drafting contracts. In order for a lawyer to find out a 
client’s preference on the matter, the lawyer has to explain to the cli-
ent what a high commitment ethic would mean. In order to negotiate 
over whether to adopt a high commitment ethic, two parties have to 
arrive at some understanding of what it would mean. If they want to 
agree that each of them will act in accordance with the highest ethi-
cal standards, they can’t simply write a covenant promising to ad-
here to “the highest ethical standards.” They cannot be sure that 
they both agree about what the “highest ethical standards” are, or 
even if they do agree, they cannot be sure that in the event of a later 
dispute, an enforcement authority would know what their under-
standing was. So, first with their clients and then with opposing law-
yers, lawyers would have to spend a lot of time discussing what these 
standards were and how they applied across the range of situations 
that might arise in their relationship between the parties. Once they 
arrived at an understanding, they would have to write out this un-
derstanding in a form intelligible to a court or other enforcement au-
thority. This process would be costly and time-consuming, too costly 
and time-consuming for most situations. 
                                                                                                                    
 28. Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The Limits of Cognition and the Limits of Contract, 47 
STAN. L. REV. 211, 251-52 (1995). 
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 In many areas, the legal system responds to this problem by pro-
viding default terms or optional terms that parties can use to fill in 
the gaps in their contracts. Private associations also provide stan-
dard form contracts designed to obviate the costs of elaborating 
terms for each deal. In the professional responsibility field, however, 
there is really only one standard form contract in each jurisdiction—
the ABA Model Rules or Code. The problem is not that deviation is 
not permitted from the Rules or Code. Although many of the rules 
are mandatory, most of them simply provide a floor; they don’t pre-
clude contracting for a higher level of commitment. But they do not 
do anything to reduce the costs of elaboration of these terms. Parties 
can have the low-commitment default terms of the ABA rules for free 
without doing anything. If they want higher standards, they have to 
assume the costs of explaining and drafting themselves. 
 My colleague Michael Klausner has suggested the preference of 
public corporations for Delaware’s corporation law might reflect, not 
the substantive superiority of Delaware law, but simply the fact that 
people are widely familiar with it and it is more extensively elabo-
rated than other states’ laws. Because opting into Delaware’s rules 
saves communication, negotiation, and drafting costs, people may 
choose it even though they don’t especially like its substance.29 It’s 
possible that the same thing accounts for the failure to draft out of 
the ABA rules. 
 And third, we have the problem of enforcement. People will nego-
tiate for a particular level of commitment only if they expect compli-
ance with the negotiated standard, and compliance usually requires 
some enforcement apparatus. Tribunals and agencies will usually 
have some enforcement powers that they can devote to punishing de-
fections from disciplinary commitments. Moreover, private actors 
who encounter each repeatedly can informally sanction defectors by 
refusing to trust them in later encounters. But where people encoun-
ter each other only once or sporadically, enforcement will be a prob-
lem. It would be easy enough to make some right of action in court 
available in contract or tort. But the high costs of enforcement in 
conventional damage suits would often not be warranted by the 
provable and recoverable damages. This, of course, is one of the rea-
sons we supplement common law enforcement of ethical duties with 
disciplinary enforcement by the agencies of the bar. But these agen-
cies, at present, are only available to enforce the low-commitment 
ethics of the ABA rules. 
 The project of competitive ethical regimes could be advanced by 
reforms designed to mitigate each of these difficulties. First, we need 
                                                                                                                    
 29. Michael Klausner, Corporations, Corporate Law, and Networks of Contracts, 81 
VA. L. REV. 757 (1995). 
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rules that force the parties to focus on and make commitments re-
garding ethical standards. It would be easy enough for tribunals and 
agencies to require those who practice before them to indicate their 
type or level of commitment, either categorically or on a case-by-case 
basis. The Rules currently require lawyers to force the client to ad-
dress the level of fees at the outset of the relation. In a similar man-
ner, they could require lawyers to raise the issue of ethical commit-
ment with both client and opposing counsel.  
 Second, to mitigate the costs of communication, negotiation, and 
specification, we need publicly subsidized alternative ethical codes. 
These codes need to be sufficiently elaborated so that, once chosen, 
they provide an array of relatively clear answers to a broad range of 
contingencies. These alternative codes would provide sets of norms 
that lawyers and clients could adopt without having to assume the 
costs of communication and drafting. They could, for example, take 
the form of a Restatement. Unfortunately, the American Legal Insti-
tute’s Restatement of the Law Governing Lawyers does not fill the bill 
at all. Like most of the Restatements, this one is largely concerned 
with summarizing the dominant tendencies of established low-
commitment doctrine. It thus reinforces the tendency to opt for this 
doctrine simply because it is easiest to do so. What we really need are 
comparably clear and developed but strongly differentiated codes 
that increase the range of ethical options. 
 Here there may be a promising role for specialized bar associa-
tions, and it is heartening to see some rising to the challenge. To 
date, the outstanding example appears to be the American Academy 
of Matrimonial Lawyers.30 The Academy is a national association of 
great prestige to which some of the most distinguished practitioners 
belong. One of its many projects is the promulgation of a code of ad-
vocacy that explicitly “aspires to a level of practice above the 
minimum established in the [Rules of Professional Conduct].”31 The 
Academy’s rules take a familiar code form, with principles followed 
by elaborative comments and illustrative cases. Many of its precepts 
seem to depart notably from the ABA rules. For example, one pro-
vides, “[a]n attorney should not permit a client to contest child cus-
tody . . . for . . . financial leverage.”32 Another condemns “avoidance of 
compliance with discovery through overly narrow construction of in-
                                                                                                                    
 30. Information regarding the American Academy of Matrimonial Lawyers can be 
found on the Internet at www.aaml.org (last visited Feb. 5, 2003). 
 31. AM. ACAD. OF MATRIMONIAL LAWYERS, BOUNDS OF ADVOCACY: GOALS FOR FAMILY 
LAWYERS, Preliminary Statement (Nov. 2000), at http://www.aaml.org/Bounds%20of%20 
Advocacy/Bounds%20of%20Advocacy.htm (last visited May 12, 2003) (on file with author). 
 32. AM. ACAD. OF MATRIMONIAL LAWYERS, BOUNDS OF ADVOCACY: GOALS FOR FAMILY 
LAWYERS R. 6.2 (Nov. 2000), at http://www.aaml.org/Bounds%20of%20Advocacy/Bounds 
%20of%20Advocacy.htm (last visited May 12, 2003) (on file with author). 
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terrogatories or requests for production.”33 More activity of this kind 
could significantly expand the range of choice and the potential for 
ethical competition. 
 The Academy, however, does not directly respond to the enforce-
ment problem. It does not sanction members for violation of its 
norms. There is no practical obstacle to its doing so. Private associa-
tions have the power of expulsion, as well as fines and reprimands, 
that can be effective deterrents. It would also be possible for the ex-
isting public enforcement agencies to enforce private codes to the ex-
tent that lawyers have made particular commitments to them.  
IV.   CONCLUSION 
 Lest my suggestion that we may not need “the bar” be taken as an 
aspersion on lawyer associational activity in general, I want to em-
phasize that I think there is a lot of valuable associational activity 
going in many areas, including that of professional responsibility. 
The work of the American Academy of Matrimonial Lawyers ethics 
code is just one example. We need more of this kind of work, as well 
as other kinds fostering pro bono representation, public education, 
peer support, and law reform. Such activities could be, and to a large 
extent are, undertaken by voluntary bar associations without the di-
rect assistance of monopolistic state power. The “bar,” the need for 
which is now in doubt, is the monopolistic bar that seeks to occupy a 
broad field exclusively with a single set of mandatory standards. 
 
                                                                                                                    
 33. AM. ACAD. OF MATRIMONIAL LAWYERS, BOUNDS OF ADVOCACY: GOALS FOR FAMILY 
LAWYERS R. 7.8 cmt. (Nov. 2000), at http://www.aaml.org/Bounds%20of%20Advocacy/ 
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